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Nationalism, Self-Determination, and 
Nationalist Movements: Exploring the 
Palestinian and Quebec Drives for 
Independence 
INTRODUCTION 
Globally, a tide of nationalist movements and re-awakened self-iden-
tity by ethnic minorities has surged. 1 The sweep of nationalist move-
ments has created world-wide social instability, precipitated by calls for 
complete independence.2 Recent examples include the bloody civil war 
in Bosnia, a resurgence of Russian nationalism, and religious chauvin-
ism in Poland.3 Perhaps the two most striking examples of the current 
wave of nationalist sentiment are the separatist movement in Quebec,4 
and the increasing demand for greater self-rule by Palestinians, who 
have been granted a current homeland carved out of Israel's "Occu-
pied Territories. "5 The Occupied Territories currently include parts of 
the West Bank6 and East Jerusalem.7 East Jerusalem, despite being 
directly brought under Israeli law is viewed by many in the interna-
tional community as an occupied territory. 8 
Under international law, the rights of ethnic minorities in "estab-
lished" states to disband from their pre-existing state is unclear.9 Fur-
1 See Peter S. Canellos, Nationalistic Stirrings a Recipe for Extremism: U.S. Should Play Role in 
Stopping Bloodshed, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 1995, at HI. 
2 !d. 
3 See id. 
4
.John Walker, Parizeau Slip in Old Tradition of Quebec, EDMONTON .J., Nov. 5, 1995, at FS. 
5 See .Joel Greenberg, West Bank: Confronting the Culture of Rebellion, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 21, 
1995, at F9. 
6 The West Bank is the territorial area which extends between the River .Jordan and Israel 
proper (Israel in its pre-1967 borders). Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The hraeli-
Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM . .J. INT'L L. 44, 58-59 (1990). 
7 !d. Previously contained in the West Bank, East .Jerusalem was brought under Israeli law, with 
extended boundaries, on .June 28, 1967, and was formally annexed on .July 30, 1980. See id. at 59. 
8 See id. Several U.N. Resolutions have recognized the Israeli-controlled territories as occupied 
territories, with some resolutions denouncing Israel's occupation as illegal. Id. at 67 (citing G.A. 
Res. 32/30 (Nov. 25, 1977), G.A. Res. 33/29 (Dec. 7, 1978) and G.A. Res. 43/54A (Dec. 6, 1988)). 
9 Ved Nanda, eta!., Self-Determination: The Case of Palestine, AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 334, 350 
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ther, international scholarship is also inconsistent with respect toward 
the rights of members of so-called occupied territories. 10 Moreover, the 
ambiguities of international law regarding the rights of these ethnic 
minorities to claim, and subsequently establish, independence, is 
largely uncertain, with political and legal theorists viewing the very 
definition of these "peoples" with ambiguity.U 
The principle of self-determination12 itself, the basis for many of 
these claims by organized ethnic minority "peoples,"13 has undergone 
a dramatic reinterpretation under the precepts of international law. 14 
The conceptualization on the part of majorities that ethnic minorities 
were entitled, if they so deemed, to an independent state has been 
largely abandoned. 15 Accordingly, the collective rights of individuals, 
particularly in established countries, are largely ignored by other es-
tablished powers. 16 One theorist views such self-determination as not 
even a moral right under international law but a right of utilityY The 
modern age has thus witnessed a more restrictive, limited interna-
tional "acceptance" of the rights of peoples seeking self-determina-
tion.1H While theorists and international law justify the right of former 
(1988). Theorists argue that allowing self-determination to go unchecked would allow minorities, 
globally, to separate, creating massive destabilization. /d. 
10 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 50-51. 
11 See Nanda, supra note 9, at 336, 339. 
12 Efren Rivera-Ramos, Self-Determination and Decolonisation in the Society of the Modern Colonial 
Welfare State, in IssuEs OF SELF-DETERMINATION 123 (Michael Twining ed., 1991). Self-determi-
nation is defined, in the modern context, as the right of a people to shape its own political destiny 
and to provide for its economic, social and political destiny. /d. 
13 MORTON H. HALPERN, ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 47-48 
(1992). "People" has been described as a unit which may have a claim to self-determination. /d. 
Whether or not such a claim of the unit reasonably exists calls for the focus upon the extent to 
which the group making a claim shares ethnic, religious or cultural bonds, although the absence 
or weakness of one of these bonds need not invalidate a claim. /d. 
14 See Richard F. Iglar, Note, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law 
of Self-Determination: Slovenia and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 213, 
222 (1992). 
15 Malvina Halberstam, Nationalism and the Right to Self-Determination: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 573,575 (1995). Several modern-day states have not allowed rights 
of self-determination for groups within their own territories, including the Soviet Union (regard-
ing the Baltics), the United States (concerning Native Americans), as well as the United Kingdom 
(regarding Northern Ireland). /d. 
16 See Richard T. DeGeorge, The Myth of the Right of Collective Self-Determination, in IssuEs OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 12, at 4-7. 
17 See id. at 7. 
18 See Halberstam, supra note 15, at 573-74. 
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colonized peoples to seek self-determination, political expedience is a 
major consideration in allowing self-determination movements to se-
cede in non-colonial states.19 
This Note explores recent trends in international law and the study 
and composition of nationalist movements, specifically analyzing the 
self-determination drives of Palestinian groups in the Occupied Terri-
tories as well as the recently reawakened drives by Quebec for secession 
from Canada. Part I identifies basic theoretical principles of self-deter-
mination, establishing working definitions of relative terms such as 
state and nationalism. Part II examines legal principles of self-determi-
nation under precepts of international law. Part III analyzes the Pales-
tinian drive for independence in the Occupied Territories and what 
precipitated, and eventually formed, the current tenuous peace. Fur-
ther, Israeli and Palestinian arguments on behalf of their respective 
legal justifications, in terms of international law, are analyzed. Part IV 
analyzes the most recent attempt by Quebec secessionists to separate 
from Canada, as evidenced by the 1995 referendum. Finally, this Note 
establishes that federalism, based upon the National Rights model, is 
the most likely means of quelling the international instability promul-
gated by self-determination movements, allowing a limited, recognized 
degree of self-determination among a state's peoples. 
I. INTERNATIONAL ScHOLARSHIP & LAw: 
DEFINITIONS OF STATE AND NATIONALISM 
Legal scholars have disputed what qualifications, if any, a certain 
group or people need to maintain in order to be afforded any existing 
international protections granted by self-determination.2° For example, 
under a professed "subjective" standard, a group must popularly desire 
to form a political entity, which accordingly may be satisfied by a 
plebiscite,21 in order to be allowed legitimate self-determination.22 Con-
versely, an "objective" standard also exists, which allows groups23 with 
19 See Rivera·Ramos, supra note 12, at 123. 
20 Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and 
International Law, 32 VA.]. INT'L L. 583, 608 (1992). 
21 See id. A plebiscite can be defined as "[a] vote by which the people of an entire country or 
district express an opinion for or against a proposal esp[ecially] on a choice of government or 
ruler." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 875 (1981). 
22 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 225. 
23 !d. One commentator has noted, extensively, the use of the term "minority" under terms of 
88 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & CoMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX, No. I 
common characteristics such as history, geography, ethnicity, religion, 
or race to associate freely through the hope of group cohesion. 24 
Applying either of the aforementioned standards must necessarily ac-
cept the proposition that a nationalist movement does, in fact, exist, 
as numerous theorists have attempted to create a working definition 
of nationalism.25 
A. Nationalist Theory: Exploring the Nature of 
Nationalism and its Theoretical Forms 
Nationalism is often characterized as an independent, often divisive 
force, offering fragmented responses and expressing alternate solu-
tions within the traditional society. 26 Nationalist sentiments may seek 
to establish a sort of familial bond between the citizen and the state or 
group seeking secession.27 Such bonds or ties create a consciousness 
through a coherent leadership ruling above a family of those sharing 
commol). values and sentiments. 28 While nationalism may thus rally a 
specific people through a united, almost familial relationship, nation-
alism may specifically hearken back to past glories or moments of 
grandeur and unification, thus seeking to unite a present group to 
rectifY any present inequitable political and/ or territorial arrange-
ments.29 A compartmentalized offshoot of nationalism known as civic 
nationalism joins all peoples in a "community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens, united in a patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values. "30 Leaders of nationalist movements in exile may, 
accordingly, seek to utilize any destabilizing effects of nationalism in 
international law. See Olivia Q. Goldman, The Need for an Independent International Mechanism to 
Protect Group Rights: A Case Study of the Kurds, 2 TuLSA]. CaMP. & lNT'L L. 45, 48 (1994). A 
minority group is thus defined as a non-dominant group within a state, with different ethnic, 
religious, and/ or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and having 
a sense of solidarity. /d. Thus, the author refutes whether a "minority" or a "people" are in essence 
the same group, stating that a "people" refers explicitly to a political situation. /d. This Note will 
not share that author's strict interpretation. 
24 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 213, 225-26. 
25 SeeHANSj. MORGENTHAU, POI.ITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR PoWER AND PEACE 
123 (6th ed. 1985). 
26 T.V. SATHYAMURTHY, NATIONALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 36 (1983). 
27 See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 27-28 (1979). 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Walker, supra note 4, at F8. 
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the state to which members of these ethnic nationalisfll groups seek 
secession.32 
If nationalism succeeds in rallying the hearts and minds of a people, 
such an outcome can call for the end of the current political condition 
of a country.33 Conversely, nationalism can also be utilized to rally a 
people to the call of the state.34 Nationalism, while potentially destabi-
lizing a state through divisiveness, can thus offer both a united vision35 
and solidarity36 to certain peoples seeking secessionY The concept of 
so-called "good nationalism" may, in fact, be a healthy composite of a 
state as it does not absolutely privilege members of one state over that 
state's non-members. 38 Good nationalism is interpreted as being com-
munitarian in nature, a nationalism which is not uncontrollable, while 
viewing individuals as free peoples who are the authors of their own 
destinies. 39 If rampant nationalism, in turn, remains unchecked or at 
the very least ignored by a state, internal aggression may result. 40 
Outlets of such aggression include class struggle, civil war, and revolu-
tion.4' Thus, disruptive "bad nationalism" can be destructive to the 
stability of a state.42 Bad nationalism worships its own vision as the 
ultimate truth, excluding non-members from sharing in the virtues and 
31 See SMITH, supra note 27, at 27. Economic nationalism may also exist, under the so-called 
"discriminatory redistribution" where some groups seck to secede from a state in order to avoid 
the continual subsidization of fellow countrymen in that parent state who are economically worse 
off than the groups contemplating secession. Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession, and the 
Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 53, 59 (1995). Examples of this include the secession of 
Biafara (from Nigeria) and Slovenia (from Yugoslavia). /d. at 59-60. 
32 See SMITH, supra note 27, at 27. 
33 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 25, at 123. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. at 4. 
36 See Buchanan, supra note 31, at 54. For example, the Palestinian National Covenant refers 
to the liberation of Palestine as both a national "duty," "aim," "struggle" and a "necessity." 
Palestinian National Covenant, arts. 10-15 (1968), reprinted in YEHUDA LuKACs, Tm: IsRAELI-PAL-
ESTINIAN CoNFLICT: A DocUMENTARY REcoRD 292-93 (1992) [hereinafter Palestinian Nat'! 
Covenant]. 
37 See Buchanan, supra note 31, at 54. One commentator has suggested that secession be 
defined as the multiplication of states, rather than viewed as a challenge to the nature of a state's 
authority. See id. 
38 Ian S. Lustick, Liberalism and Nationalism: Can They be Joined?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 
265,267 (reviewing YAEL TAMIR, LIRERALISM AND NATIONALISM: CAN THEY BE.JOINED? (1994)). 
:19 See id. 
40 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 25, at 123. 
41 See id. 
42 See Lustick, supra note 38, at 267. 
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rewards of community life.43 Ethnic nationalism, a form of bad nation-
alism by definition, can also be chauvinistic, because such nationalism 
contends that an individual's deepest attachments are inherited, not 
chosen.44 
B. An Overview of International Law: A Theoretical Framework 
for the Right to Secede 
The right of a people to secede from a nation is not a guaranteed 
right under internationallaw.45 For example, United Nations Resolu-
tion 2625, establishing many of the guidelines for the interpretation 
of self-determination, allows the expression of self-determination 
through independence, free association, or integration within an in-
dependent state.46 Resolution 2625 does not, however, explicitly allow 
for separation from the parent state.47 Further, Resolution 2625 spe-
cifically states that self-determination must not be interpreted as the 
authorization, or even encouragement, of any action which would 
either partially or totally disrupt the political or territorial unity of 
sovereign and independent states.48 
The ability of a nation to secede at will would necessarily violate 
principles of customary international law because states49 have been 
historically accepted as entirely sovereign.50 Moreover, international 
law implies that the right to secede is based solely upon the relation-
ship between colonial powers and colonized states. 51 If such a limitation 
exists, future secession from non-colonial powers would thus be even 
harder to justify under precepts of international law. 52 Some theorists 
43 See id. 
44 See Walker, supra note 4, at F8. 
45 See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 604. 
46 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Acwrdance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Resolution 2625]. 
47 /d. 
4S /d. 
49 For purposes of this Note, the definition of state will be utilized based on the 1987 Restate-
ment which defines a state as "[a]n entity which has a defined territory and permanent popula-
tion, under the control of its own government, and which engages in, or has the capacity to 
engage in, formal relations with other such entities." CovEY T. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 83 (4th ed. 1995). 
50 /d. at 82-83. 
51 Iglar, supra note 14, at 128 (citing G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 
144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)). 
52 See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 612-13. 
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have suggested that the key factors which necessitate a recognition of 
a legitimate self-determination movement is dependent upon group 
affiliation, territorial boundaries and time.53 
Legal scholars have attempted to categorize a set of common criteria 
in order to determine which self-determinist movements are indeed 
"legitimate" in terms of international law.54 The criteria includes the 
necessary identification of the group that is claiming the right of 
self-determination, the nature and scope of the group's claim, the 
underlying reasons for the claim, and the degree of deprivation of 
basic human rights. 55 The modern trend in legal scholarship, following 
the Nuremberg Trials,56 has been a concerted emphasis on abiding by 
tenets of natural law, subordinating the obligations of the state to 
individual citizens rather than to its individual self as represented by 
its leaders.57 
II. SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Understanding Self-Determination: Exploring the History and 
Evolution of Nationalist Movements Through Precepts of 
International Law 
The modern interpretation of self-determination 58 took root with the 
emergence of eighteenth century Western democracies.59 These West-
ern political systems, having disposed of monarchies, focused on gov-
ernment control by their citizens.60 This was the antithesis of the ideals 
of nineteenth century political philosophers such as Kant, Marx and 
53 See id. at 603. 
54 See Ved P. Nanda, Seif.IJetermination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 
CAsE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 257, 267-70 (1981). 
55 See id. 
56 David Luban et a!., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 
2350-53 (1993), cited in OLIVER, supra note 49, at 858-60. The post-World War II Nuremberg 
Trials involved the actions of an international tribunal which prosecuted several individuals for 
their involvement with the Nazi government in Germany. /d. The Nuremberg Trials are often 
described as a watershed of international law, involving for the first time trials dealing with crimes 
against humanity. See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Self determination has been defined as the right of a people to secede from their present 
government. Buchanan, supra note 31, at 54. One commentator has stated that self-determination 
rights are political rather than legal in nature, such as the right to utilize land or develop natural 
resources. /d. 
59 See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 599. 
60 See id. 
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Hegel, who focused on the historical capacity of individuals to act in 
a free, purposeful and autonomous manner.61 This individual-based 
self-determination was given a more group-centered understanding in 
the writings of socialists such as Lenin at the onset of the twentieth 
century. 52 
Following the First World War, which saw the dissolution of several 
multi-nationalist states, including the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires, states recognized that nationalist aspirations of ethnic minori-
ties needed to be addressed.63 If nationalist sentiments were left un-
checked and never truly addressed, states recognized that precipitous 
results could follow, as evidenced by the dissolution of several states 
and the emergence of new states based on ethnicity.64 A multitude of 
treaties, overseen by the League of Nations following World War I, 
granted to the peoples of newly-created states the right to citizenship, 
equality of treatment, non-discrimination, and the right to use one's 
own language. 55 Woodrow Wilson, a proponent of self-determination, 56 
felt that the realization of such aspirations by treating such peoples 
as credible, rather than merely considering them "property," and 
achieved through a restructuring of Europe would create a lasting 
peace.67 Wilson's principles were based upon basic adherence to demo-
cratic principles which, in turn, would foster a global peace through 
reflections of general human goodness. 58 
While the victorious Allies utilized language as a basis for defining 
a given "people," the result promulgated the birth of new states.69 In 
turn, the creation of a plenitude of new ethnic minorities was realized. 70 
61 See Rivera-Ramos, supra note 12, at 123. 
62 !d. 
63 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 224 (citing the International Convention on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force,] an. 3, 1976)). 
The Note cited provides examples of international agreements concerning "group rights." 
64 See Asbm:jn Eide, Minority Situations: In Search of Peaceful and Constructive Solutions, 66 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1311, 1314 (1991). 
65 HuRST HANNUM, AuTONOMY, SovEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE AccoMMODA-
TION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 51-52 (1996). 
66 President Wilson's passionate defense of the need to ensure international self-determination 
is evidenced in his address before the United States Congress in 1918, stating, "[n)ational 
aspirations must be respected, peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their 
consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principal of action, which 
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." 56 CoNG. REc. 1952 (1918). 
67 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 222 n.67. 
68 !d. 
69 !d. at 222. 
70 See Eide, supra note 64, at 1314-15. 
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During the period of decolonization 71 which emerged in the 1960s and 
continued through the 1970s, territorial states were created by grants 
of independence from their colonizing parental nations. 72 
Modern international legal interpretation of self-determination has 
largely adopted the objective standard when evaluating the legal valid-
ity of self-determination. 73 Many commentators, noting the uncertainty 
of actually identifYing the legal justifications for secession under inter-
national law, simply apply a political analysis when determining 
whether a group should be allowed to secede.74 Another aspect of any 
discussion regarding the state from which an ethnic minority seeks to 
separate is whether that state is a monist, or dualist, state.75 Monist 
states, such as France, adhere to international law as supreme to their 
own.76 Conversely, dualist states, such as Israel, the United States and 
Canada, assume that domestic law applies over internationallaw.77 
1. The United Nations 
Several United Nations (U.N.) Resolutions,7R as well as the United 
Nations Charter (Charter) itself, recognize principles of self-determi-
71 One author has described the traditional colonial situation as containing several possible 
characteristics. CHRISTOPHER 0. QUAYE, LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INn:RNATIONAL LAW 9 
(1991). First, the "traditional" colonial situation involves a regime of the metropolitan power that 
denies statehood to its overseas territories. Id. Secondly, a colonization example may contain a 
struggle against new states created under the League of Nations' mandate system that currently 
refuses to give up those territories. Id. Third, struggles against racist regimes in independent or 
quasi-independent countries reveal colonialist sentiments. Id. Fourth, struggles against neighbor-
ing countries seeking to annex former colonies after the end of the colonial system provides an 
example of acceptable self-determination movements under the colonial framework. Id. 
72 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 223. 
73 Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 604 (citing Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara 
(Morocco v. Spain), 1975 I.CJ. 12 (Oct. 16)). In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the 
decision of Spain to dispose of its Western Sahara colony precipitated both Mauritania and 
Morocco, based on historical claims, to vie for control of that territory. See Advisory Opinion on 
Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. at 31-35. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), while recognizing 
that the U.N. General Assembly still may establish procedures for such a disposition, determined 
that Spain's decision would control. !d. Thus, the ICJ held that the present peoples of the Western 
Sahara could decide their own governmental destiny. See id. Strict legalists may infer that the 
right of self-determination, as judged by the ICJ's decision, was limited to decolonized peoples. 
See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 604. 
74 See id. 
7-' See OLIVER, supra note 49, at 16-17, 1264. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 Halberstam, supra note 15, at 574; see also International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into 
force Jan. 4, 1969). 
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nation.79 The U.N., revealing the importance of self-determination, 
characterizes such a right as a fundamental human right, consistent 
with the Charter.80 Accordingly, the U.N. has found that all "people" 
have the right to "freely determine" their political status, and have their 
own choice as to how to pursue their own economic, political, and 
social development.81 Protection of the international right of self-de-
termination is thus one of the founding hallmarks of the United 
Nations.82 
Moreover, the goal of promoting the self-determination of peoples 
is expressly stated, and recognized, in the creation of the U.N.'s insti-
tutional framework. 83 The U.N. has specifically entrusted trustee states 
of trust countries to promote, if not encourage, self-determination 
within those territories.84 Irrespective of the UN-supported documents 
regarding the "right" of self-determination, legal scholars disagree as 
to whether self-determination should be afforded the binding charac-
terization of customary internationallaw.85 
The U.N. recognizes that the use of force in achieving self-determi-
nation is permissible.86 Such force cannot include terrorism, and must 
be used in furtherance of a legitimate political goal.87 States are, ac-
cordingly, allowed under international law to use force to repel an 
attack by a self-determination movement.88 The force must be in re-
sponse to an imminent attack or employed under circumstances in 
which there could be no other means of repelling an imminent at-
tack.89 Finally, the use of force must be proportional to the attack that 
occasioned it.90 
79 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 'II 2, 55. 
80 Resolution 2625, supra note 46. 
81 /d. 
82 U.N. Charter Article I, Paragraph 2 reveals that the United Nations was created to promulgate 
"[F]riendly relations among people based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples .... "U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 2. 
83 See id. art. 55. 
84 U.N. Charter Article 73 states that such trustee states "[r]ecognize the principle that the 
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the 
obligation to promote to the utmost ... the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories 
and ... to develop self-government, to take account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and 
to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions .... " /d. art. 73. 
85 See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 603. 
86 OLIVER, supra note 49, at 1364--65. 
87 /d. 
88 QuAYE, supra note 71, at 273. 
89 /d. 
90 /d. 
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While terrorism91 is unacceptable under international law,92 innu-
merable General Assembly resolutions reaffirm the right of a people's 
self-determination.93 Article 27 of the Political Rights Covenant94 guar-
antees that in states with ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority groups, 
members of those groups cannot be denied the right to e~oy their 
own culture, practice their own religion, or utilize their individual 
language.95 Subsequent U.N. Conventions have supported various 
measures, including the disbanding of all forms of discrimination in 
education, as well as race discrimination.96 
2. The Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
International agreements beyond the auspices of the U.N. have 
reaffirmed an international recognition of the right to self-determina-
tion.97 For example, the Helsinki Accord of 1975, agreed to by thirty-
three European states, as well as both Canada and the United States, 
recognizes self-determination principles.98 Principle VIII of the Hel-
sinki Accord specifically addresses self-determination.99 While none of 
the signatories of the Helsinki Accord are current colonial states, the 
broadening to accept non-colonial self-determination movements as 
legally recognizable secessionist movements has thus gained momen-
tum since 1975.100 
The follow-up meeting of the CSCE, held between 1986 and 1989, 
specifically addressed minority issues, as participating states must re-
frain from discrimination against persons belonging to minorities. 101 
States must also contribute to the realization of the legitimate interests 
91 Terrorism is defined as indiscriminate, violent attacks involving the taking of hostages. 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 
Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, at 4. 
92 !d. 
93 See Halberstam, supra note 15, at 573-74. 
94 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
Y5 !d. 
96 Goldman, supra note 23, at 54-56. 
97 See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 
I.L.M. 1292. 
98 !d. 
99 !d. Principle VIII states that "[a]ll peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to deter-
mine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external inter-
ference." !d. 
100 See Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 601-02. 
IOI See Goldman, supra note 23, at 59-60. 
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of the minority in the human rights arena. 102 For example, Paragraph 
19 of the Helsinki Act obliges the participating states to ensure condi-
tions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious 
identity of national minorities in their territories, and to ensure their 
full equality. 103 
In the CSCE's Conference on the Human Dimension, held in june, 
1990 in Copenhagen, the resulting Copenhagen Document included 
an entire section on ethnic minorities, and strongly affirmed the lin-
guistic freedom for minorities. 104 The Copenhagen Document thus 
allows national minorities to establish and maintain their own educa-
tional institutions, and it suggests that in order to protect the territorial 
integrity of a state, it may be necessary to devolve onto a minority group 
whole political functions and powers. 105 The Report of the Geneva 
CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities applies an even more 
ringing endorsement of the global acknowledgment of a people's 
rights of self-determination, stating that issues regarding national mi-
norities are "[m]atters oflegitimate international concern and do not 
constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective state. "106 
B. The Rights of Self-Determination of Peoples in Legally-Created 
"Occupied Territories" 
International law regarding occupied territories allows the occupant, 
or occupying state, to wield certain powers while limiting other powers, 
in order to ensure that the occupied peoples are treated with humanity 
throughout the occupation.107 Thus, international law seeks to protect 
the sovereign rights of the legitimate government of the occupied 
territory, while protecting the inhabitants from being exploited. 108 Citi-
zens in occupied territories receive the humanitarian protections of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 109 Prolonged occupations, lasting 
greater than five years, have drawn the attention of international re-
102 Id. 
103 ld. at 54--56. 
104 HALPERN, supra note 13, at 57-58. 
1os Id. 
106 Id. at 59. 
107Roberts, supra note 6, at 46. 
108 ld. at 48. 
109 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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gimes. no During such prolonged occupations the international law of 
human rights is granted further importance.m 
III. PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 
A. The Roots of Palestinian Nationalism: From the Birth of the 
State of Israel to the Inception of the Occupied Territories 
Palestine, before the First World War, was a state administered by the 
Ottoman Empire and consisted of a mostly Arabic, heterogeneous and 
otherwise divided people. 112 The Palestinian people varied from villag-
ers who supported themselves through farming to the southern, mostly 
nomadic Bedouins. 113 The diverse range of those living in Palestine, 
including Sunni Muslims, Shiites, and Druze, as well as Greek Ortho-
dox, were frequently at odds with one another. 114 
At the onset of the twentieth century, an increasing number of 
Jewsu5 began to settle in Palestine. 116 Those Jews that were native 
Palestinians, like Christians, were dhimmis, a designation under the 
Ottoman Empire signifying second-class citizenship. 117 Early Jewish set-
tlers did not seek Ottoman citizenship, but carried an idea of national 
unity and identity_ll8 Existing Palestinian-Arabs resented the large mi-
gration of Jewish settlers,119 while Palestinians often sold their land to 
Zionist120 landowners. 121 Following the dictates of the Sykes-Picot Agree-
110 Roberts, supra note 6, at 48, 50-51. The author lists occupations which have drawn the 
concern of the international community due to their time frame: South Africa in Namibia (five 
years), Turkish forces in Cyprus (four years), and the presence of Moroccan forces in the Western 
Sahara (four years). !d. 
111 !d. at 52. 
112 IAN j. BICKERTON & CARLA L. CLAUSNER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CoNFLICT 15-17 (1995). 
113 Jd. 
114 /d. at 18. 
115 By 1914, the Jewish population of Palestine was estimated at 13 percent, with 5,000 Arabs 
working Jewish lands. !d. at 22. 
116 George E. Bisharat, Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. 
U. L. REv. 467, 475-76 (1994). 
ll7BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 18. 
118 !d. at 27. 
119 See Bisharat, supra note 116, at 496-502. 
l2°DEBORAH GERNER, ONE LAND, Two PEOPLES 201 (1991). "Zionism" has been defined as 
nineteenth and twentieth century Jewish nationalism, generally, but not exclusively, taking the 
form of support for Israel as a Jewish state. !d. 
121 See Bisharat, supra note 116, at 496-502. 
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ment, 122 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire123 at the close of World 
War I, Palestine became a mandate124 of Great Britain in July of 1922.125 
Throughout the ensuing years, Palestine remained centered around 
uncertainty: the Hussein-McMahan correspondence at the end of 
World War I suggested that, in return for Arab support, Arabs would 
attain control of Palestine at the close of the war. 126 Contravening this 
promise was the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which appeared to rec-
ognize the need for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Pales-
tine.127 Moreover, the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 advocated that 
both Palestinians and Jews be merged into one binational state. 128 
With the rise in power of anti-Semitic governments in Europe, a 
massive influx of Jews migrated into Palestine.129 Absentee Palestinian 
landlords and wealthy city merchants began to sell their lands at in-
flated prices to the new Jewish settlers. 130 As the Jewish presence in-
creased, Palestinians instituted a revolt between 1936 and 1939, which 
initially was characterized by strikes, non-payment of taxes, and various 
other forms of general civil disobedience, yet devolved to open vio-
lence resulting in numerous casualties for both Jews and Palestinians.131 
In worldwide reaction to the Nazi atrocities of World War II, the U.N. 
General Assembly voted on November 29, 1947 in favor of U.N. Reso-
lution 181, which called for the creation of separate Arab and Jewish 
states within a partitioned Palestine. 132 That vote, thirty-three to thir-
122 See GERNER, supra note 120, at 29-32. The 1916 agreement, conducted between a British 
and a French diplomat, respectively, sought to divide the Ottoman Empire at the close of World 
War 1 into zones where both countries could exercise either direct, or indirect, influence. !d. 
123 See Nanda, supra note 9, at 339. It has been suggested that Palestine, before the disintegra-
tion of the Ottoman Empire, was a compendium of provinces within that Empire, and thus its 
citizens never had the territorial bond or common heritage which, as previously mentioned, 
theorists view as a critical element of establishing a viable state. !d. 
124 GERNER, supra note 120, at 28. "Mandate" is defined as Britain and France's respective 
commission to administer the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire's former subject states and 
to prepare them for independence, as confirmed by the League of Nations. !d. The Mandate 
Territories were Syria and Lebanon, awarded to France, and Iraq and Palestine, awarded to 
Britain. BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 43. 
12"GERNER, supra note 120, at 28. 
126 See id. at 29-31. 
127 !d. at 31. 
128 See Nanda, supra note 9, at 336. 
129 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 52. 
130 !d. at 49. 
131 GERNER, supra note 120, at 27. 
132 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 91. The Muslim countries (together with India, 
Yugoslavia and Greece) voted against partition. !d. The United States and the Soviet bloc, together 
with several other nations including France and Australia, supported the partition. !d. 
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teen, with ten abstentions, also included the U.N.'s administration of 
Jerusalem as an international city. 133 On May 15, 1948, the British 
mandate ended and the state of Israel was proclaimed.134 On that same 
date Arab armies entered Israel: the Arab Legion (consisting mainly 
of Arab irregulars from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) went into Judea and 
Samaria, now known as the West Bank; the Egyptian army moved 
through Gaza and the Negev; the Lebanese went into Galilee; the Iraqis 
moved alongside the Arab Legion; and the Syrians remained at their 
border. 135 By 1949 the war was over, with the Israelis occupying part of 
Palestine, the newly-established Jordan occupying the West Bank, as 
well as the remainder of Palestine east of the Jordan River, and Egypt 
occupying the Gaza Strip. 136 
In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was estab-
lished to represent these Palestinians. 137 The June, 1967 War between 
Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan led to a further 
displacement of Palestinians, as Israel gained control of the so-called 
Occupied Territories. 138 The Occupied Territories containing Palestini-
ans included the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and EastJerusalem.139 U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 242, issued on November 22, 1967, while 
a bilateral obligation, called for the "[w]ithdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."140 The new 
territories held by Israel added an additional 1.5 million Palestinians, 
further exacerbating tensions. 141 
In 1970, Jordan's King Hussein, disturbed with rising Palestinian 
nationalism in his own country, and rising criticism by the Palestinian 
nationalists, expelled the PL0. 142 The PLO in Jordan had become a 
serious threat to Jordan's potential stability with Israel, inviting Israel's 
133 See id. 
134GERNER, supra note 120, at 44-45. 
135 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 95-96. 
I36GERNER, supra note 120, at 50. The War, known to Arabs as al-Nagbah (The Disaster), 
precipitated the mass evacuation of Palestinians, with only 120,000-150,000 of a pre-war total of 
900,000 Palestinians remaining in what was then the official state of Israel. !d. The vast majority 
of the displaced Palestinians were the fellahin, unskilled workers and dispossessed peasants who 
went to refugee camps. BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note ll2, at 107. 
137 Augustus R. Norton, in THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION 
ORGANIZATION 1, 2-3 (Augustus R. Norton & Martin H. Greenberg eds., 1989). 
l38 Bisharat, supra note 116, at 524. 
139 Roberts, supra note 6, at 62. 
140 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF /22/Rev.2 (1967). 
141 GERNER, supra note 120, at 74. 
142 !d. at 127. 
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retaliation upon Jordan for the PLO's terrorist activities. 143 On Novem-
ber 28, 1971, a PLO-sponsored terrorist group killed the Jordanian 
Prime Minister.144 Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the sub-
sequent rapprochement with Egypt in the 1978 Camp David Accords, 
Palestinian nationalists' frustration grew, culminating in the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, forcing Yasir Arafat, the PLO Chairman, 
to regroup his headquarters in Tunis.145 
1. Self-Perception through Struggle: The Intifadah 
In determining whether or not the Palestinians are, in fact, a specific 
"people" for purposes of international law, the structure of the group, 
as well as its actions in hopes of self-determination, must be carefully 
scrutinized.146 Palestinians, in an attempt to regain their self-determi-
nism, waged a structured war against the Israeli occupation.147 This war, 
known as the Intifadah, 148 began on December 8, 1987, when an Israeli 
truck struck two Arab vans at a Gaza Strip checkpoint, killing four 
Arabs.149 The incident touched off a wave of protests as Palestinians 
began blocking streets, setting fires, throwing stones, and making 
Molotov cocktails, all viewed as a means of establishing an independent 
state under the PL0.150 
The Intifadah was the result of a culmination of Palestinian frustra-
tions.151 The Palestinians lived in occupied lands with curtailed civil 
rights, had little faith in the Arab governments for support, and were 
disillusioned with the inefficiency of the PL0.152 The Israeli reply to 
the Intifadah was swift: by November of 1988, 150 Palestinians were 
killed, their leaders had been deported, over 11,500 casualties oc-
curred (nearly two-thirds of the casualties were children under fifteen 
14~BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 168. 
144 /d. at 169. 
145 GERNER, supra note 120, at 204. The Israelis struck Lebanon because the PLO had carved 
out a mini-state in Lebanon from which to launch military operations against Israel. See id. 
146 Goldman, supra note 23, at 45-47. Some theorists have argued that the "self-perception" of 
a group must be analyzed in determining whether the group warrants a protected status. Id. For 
example, the group's history, geography and language are considered. /d. 
147 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 235. 
148 Intifadah translates as "shaking off." /d. 
149 George D. Moffett Ill, After 2 Years, Palestinians Dig in for War of Attrition, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MONITOR, Dec. 8, 1989, at 1. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 235. 
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years old) and several homes were demolished. 153 By mid-1990, the 
human casualties increased in skirmishes with Israeli troops, with over 
800 Palestinians killed in encounters with the Israeli Defense Force 
troops. 154 Some 200 of those casualties were under sixteen years old. 155 
Finally, the Initfadah cost the Israeli Defense Forces a staggering $500 
million by 1990, beyond the high cost of their own casualties. 156 
Palestinian nationalism varies widely in both composition 157 as well 
as technique, as illustrated by the several vastly different representative 
organizations. 158 The PLO, composed of four political factions, is 
largely dominated by Fateh, 159 created by Yassir Arafat. 16° Fateh, while 
outwardly moderate161 as compared to other rival Palestinian groups, 
created the Jihad Squads in the Occupied Territories, a challenge to 
the extremist group Hamas, while their official propaganda has be-
come at times increasingly religious. 162 To be sure, the original platform 
of the PLO calls for the destruction of Israel, 163 and terrorist acts such 
as the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre, conducted by a Fateh-
offshoot group entitled Black September, were fundamental charac-
teristics of Fateh and the PLO itself. 164 With waning global support in 
the 1980s, the Intifadah promoted massive exposure, as it purposely 
pitted hopelessly under-armed, and comparatively defenseless, oppo-
nents against the Israeli occupying forces. 165 In a further overture to 
153 !d. 
154 !d. 
155 !d. 
156 !d. 
157 Matti Steinberg, The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism, 52 jERUSALEM Q. 24, 39 
( 1989). Religious bonds, irrespective of the various factious Palestinian representative groups, do 
exist: 95 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank are Sunni Muslims, while the figure for the 
Gaza Strip is 98 percent. !d. 
158 See Rashid K.halidi, in THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 137, at 59, 60-62. 
159 Detlev Vagts & Malvina Halbertstam, 86 AM.]. INT'L L. 424, 425 ( 1988) (reviewing HARRIS 
0. SCHOENBERG, A MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PLO (1988). "Fateh" 
or "fatah" is the Arab word for "conquest." !d. 
160 See GERNER, supra note 120, at 118-21. 
161 Khalidi, supra note 158, at 60-61. 
162 Steinberg, supra note 157, at 40, 43. 
163 Palestinian Nat'! Covenant, supra note 36, art. 15., at 293. 
164 GERNER, supra note 120, at 122. 
165 SeeYasir Arafat, Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg (Sept. 13, 1988), in LuKAcs, 
supra note 36, at 403-11. Arafat states that the PLO "[h]oped that the sight of children wielding 
stones to confront armored vehicles, gunfire, and suffocating gas would be sufficient to arouse 
the consciousness of Israeli occupiers .... " !d. at 405. 
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garner popular support, Chairman Arafat condoned Israel's right to 
exist, supporting U.N. Resolution 181,166 
2. Hamas 
While the PLO has maintained a more moderate approach, on 
through the signing of the peace accord on September 13, 1995,167 
other nationalist groups, such as Hamas (an acronym for zeal), 168 have 
become much more vocal. 169 Hamas, also known as the Islamic Resis-
tance Movement, currently calls for a Jihad (holy war) as the only 
solution for the Palestinian problem.170 While initially supported by 
Israel as a counterweight to the PLO, it became militant and its foun-
der, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was imprisoned by the Israeli government. 171 
Hamas, as evidenced through its increasing membership as well as 
significant influence, effectively combines Palestinian nationalism with 
Islamic zeal in a culture of struggle that honors a glorious death and 
rejects as sinful the compromises necessary for a peaceful resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 172 The Hamas Covenant itself views 
international conferences and peace proposals as merely "vain endeav-
ors," declaring the Palestinian goal for self-determinism a religious 
problem.173 In short, Hamas, at least through its military wing, seeks 
the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state. 174 The 
military wing of Hamas, the Iziddin al-Quassam (Quassam Brigades), 
has committed various acts of aggression, with accompanying state-
ments reaffirming its position that the group loves death more than 
life. 175 
In early March of 1996, Hamas conducted four suicide bomb attacks 
on Israel in a one-week span. 176 While the military wing of Hamas has 
acknowledged the will of its political leader, Mahmoud Zahar, to stop 
166 See Yasir Arafat, Geneva Press Statement (Dec. 15, 1988), in LuKAcs, supra note 36, at 434. 
167 See Hamas Issues Treat to Israel, ST. LoUis PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 1996, at 6A. 
168 Michael Parks, Ready to Kill, Ready to Die, Hamas Zealots Thwart Peace, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
1994, at l. 
169 See Amos Perlmutter, Future that Belongs to Hamas ?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at A19. 
170 See Excerpts from the Covenant of Hamas (Aug. 18, 1988), in LuKAcs, supra note 36, at 
401-03 [hereinafter Covenant of Hamas]. 
171Julian Ozanne, Hamas Threatened 1Yy its Own Divisions, FIN. TiMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at 4. 
172 Parks, supra note 168, at l. 
173 See Covenant of Hamas, supra note 170, at 401-03. 
174 See id.; Parks, supra note 168, at l. 
175 Parks, supra note 168, at l. 
176 Amy D. Marcus, Splits in Hamas Help Spark Blasts in Israel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1996, at A13. 
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the attacks and give the Palestinian Authority a chance to negotiate 
with Israel, a breakaway cell within Hamas has ignored the request. 177 
The refusal to obey the Hamas leadership reveals that the group itself 
is fractious. 178 Palestinian opinion polls have shown that support for 
Hamas, once running near forty percent, has dropped to about fifteen 
percent. 179 Accordingly, Chairman Arafat is in a tenuous position, nei-
ther wishing to disassociate himself from Israel, nor antagonize the 
Hamas faction. 180 With the notable exception of Iran, the Arab world 
has officially voiced their frustration with Hamas' terrorist tactics 
through diplomatic means. 181 
B. Secession and the Occupied Territories 
The Israeli government has consistently referred to the Occupied 
Territories as administrative territories, thus disputing whether their 
legal status warrants the legal protections offered by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 182 Accordingly, some Israeli court decisions have accepted 
that the Geneva Convention applies, while other decisions have not. 183 
Moreover, Israel, while stating that it shall abide by the humanitarian 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, has not revealed what 
provisions of the Convention it regards as humanitarian conditions. 184 
Certainly, irrespective of whether or not humanitarian concerns are 
thus admitted, the question does persist whether a "prolonged occu-
pation," in the context of international law, allows self-determination 
movements to even exist. 185 Moreover, international treaties explicitly 
allow peoples the right to self-determination, and, if necessary, the 
177 !d. 
178 See Serge Schemann, Israeli Forces Seal Off Big Parts of West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, 
at Al. 
179 Marcus, supra note 176, at A13. 
180 !d. 
181 Updates, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. 
182 Roberts, supra note 6, at 62. Israel ratified the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1951. !d. 
183 !d. at 64; see also Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum of Law (Aug. 1, 1977), 
17 I.L.M. 432, 433 ( 1978) (decision on offshore oil exploitation in the Suez questions the 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
184 Roberts, supra note 6, at 66. 
185 !d. If Palestinians are advocating that international legal resolutions apply, such as the 
recognition of U.N. resolutions terming the Israeli occupation as illegal, the Palestinian position 
is weakened considerably. See id. For example, Palestinian self-determination was never men-
tioned in either U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 or 338. See id. Security Council Resolution 
242 (Nov. 22, 1967) provided for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in the 1967 war, on 
top of the cessation of all claims or states of belligerency. See id. Security Council Resolution 338 
(Oct. 22, 1973) reaffirmed Resolution 242. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 66. 
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right to struggle to attain such independence.186 Finally, the U.N. also 
granted the PLO observer status, further "legitimizing," under inter-
national law, the PLO as a liberation movement. 187 
C. The Current Status: Political Resolutions Abrogating 
International Law 
As peace negotiations continue, a sort of cultural nothingness that 
former self-determination movements, now citizens in a burgeoning 
state, must face, raises Palestinian tensions. 188 Youths accustomed to 
often violent rebellion must somehow rechannel their former aggres-
sion into coalescence, accepting the Palestinian government in order 
to cease such tensions. 189 Further, the peace proposal, which envisions 
Palestine somehow being in a confederal relationship190 with Jordan, 
has raised concerns with Palestinians and Jordanians alike. 191 Speci-
fically, the relationship between Jordan and the PLO, now the recog-
nized government of the Palestinian-controlled territories, has been a 
history marked with violence and tensions. 192 These tensions included 
a threat by the PLO to usurp power from King Hussein in Jordan 
during the 1970s.193 
Following the Peace Accords, both PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat as 
well as Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres received international accolades, culminating in the 
receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. 194 The Israeli prime minister was 
assassinated on November 4, 1995 by aJewish extremist upon exiting 
1Rfi See Resolution 2625, supra note 46. 
1H7 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 80 (citing G.A. Res. 3237 (Nov. 22, 1974)). 
188 See Greenberg, supra note 5, at F9. Palestinian police must now confront violent separatist 
groups such as the Fatah Hawks. !d. 
189 See id. 
190 Taher Shriteh, Palestinians Pessimistic About Arab Summit, Reuters World Service, June 22, 
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. Palestinians continue to feel pessimistic 
about general Arab support, as evidenced by the cynical attitude prevalent among the Palestinians 
prior to the Arab Summit of 1996, where Palestinian self-rule was supposed to be discussed. !d. 
In actuality, the Arab Summit did agree upon a stern communique, requiring Israel to withdraw 
from the Occupied Territories (including Jerusalem), and enable the Palestinians to set up an 
independent state. Storer H. Rowley, Arabs Tell Israelis to Honor Peace Plan, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 
1996, at 1. 
191 George]. Church, All Together Now, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993, at 36, 86. The PLO seeks confed-
eration to be a freely chosen act by a fully independent state, while the Israelis want such a 
confederation a condition. !d. 
192 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 168-69. 
l93GERNER, supra note 120, at 127. 
194 CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 9, 1994), 1994 WL 3306076 [hereinafter 
CBS Evening News]. 
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a pro-peace rally of 150,000 people in Tel Aviv. 195 The assassination 
came on the heels of growing resentment in certain circles to the 
Palestinian Peace Accords, which ceded most of the West Bank as well 
as all of Gaza to Palestinian self-rule. 196 For example, the conservative 
Likud Party has long opposed the "land for peace" proposal which the 
Labour Party has embraced.197 The Likud party platform itself con-
tained a goal for settling the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 198 
Further, though declining in membership, Hamas has fanatical 
members, with its leaders dominating members through visions of 
armed struggle, as well as securing Jerusalem as the capital of the 
Palestinian state. 199 Hamas, viewing the PLO's accord with Israel as too 
lenient and insufficient openly considers Chairman Arafat a traitor,200 
and vows to continue its violent efforts. 201 The grass-roots support of 
Hamas202 has led to the development of major Hamas training centers 
in Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah in the West Bank, and in EastJeru-
salem.203 Each time Hamas undertakes a violent course of events, such 
as the suicide bombings in Israel on March 3-4, 1996, the Israeli Peace 
Process is invariably affected. 204 
195 lsraeliExtremist Kills Rabin, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 5, 1995, atA1 [hereinafter Israeli Extrem-
ist]. 
196Jd. 
197 Michael Parks, Shambles in Likud Over Peace Plan, THE GuARDIAN, Sept. 28, 1993, at 12. 
Specifically, Likud has demanded the prevention of any Palestinian state, the preservation of the 
unity of Jerusalem, the maintenance of the Israeli Army's responsibility for security and no 
readmission of Palestinian refugees. /d. 
198 Tom Masland, Israel vs. Israel: The Enemy Within, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 47, 47. 
I99Perlmutter, supra note 169, at A19. 
200 Mary Curti us, Militants Toss Arafat from Mosque, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 4, 1994, at 012. 
One example of the Palestinian growing dissatisfaction with Arafat's leadership was the jostling 
of Arafat, who attempted to pray over a Palestinian nationalist. /d. Further, a Hamas team based 
in Jordan purportedly conspired to assassinate Arafat during a visit to Gaza's Martyr's Cemetery 
on April 28, 1996. Martin Sieff, Arafat Bargains with Israel for a Palestinian State, WAsH. TIMES, 
May 6, 1996, at AI. 
201 See Elaine R. Fletcher, Tension Builds as Gaza 's Support for Peace Pact Ebbs Disillusionment, 
Militants' Support Grows when Treaty Fails to Improve Life, S.F. ExAMINER, Nov. 27, 1994, at B15. 
Recently, Hamas has purportedly gone so far as to distribute leaflets calling for an intifadah 
against Yassir Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Leaflet Seeks Arafat Ouster, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 
1996, at AS. 
2°2 Wafa Amar, Hamas Founder Said to Want Attacks Suspended, Reuters World Service, May 23, 
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. The jailed Ham as leader, despite the acts of 
the Hamas organization, has called for the group to suspend attacks against Israel until final 
status peace talks between Israel and the PLO end. ld. 
203 Parks, supra note 168, at I. 
204 See Hamas Bombings in Israel Send Peace Process Reeling, Mar. 7, 1996, Facts on File World 
News Digest, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. Following those bombings, then Prime 
Minister Peres vowed that Israel would recognize no territorial restrictions in its response to 
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The effect of Hamas to forestall peace negotiations through violent 
acts has been counter-productive.205 Following the Hamas bombings in 
March of 1996, the Palestinian National Council voted to scrap calls 
for the destruction of Israel in its 1968 Charter.206 The vote, 504 to 54 
in favor, while also attempting to aid the Peres bid for re-election, was 
primarily in hopes of Israel continuing to fulfill that nation's commit-
ments under the Peace Accords: a partial withdrawal from the West 
Bank town of Hebron, the freeing of prisoners and the building of 
access roads between the West Bank and Gaza.207 
Arguably the most daunting roadblock to the continuation of Pales-
tinian-Israeli peace talks is the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu 
as prime minister of Israel.2°8 Prior to his election, Netanyahu pledged 
to keep building new Jewish settlements in land supposedly being 
turned over to the Palestinians under the 1993 Israel-PLO peace un-
derstanding.209 He also vowed never to negotiate with the PLO regard-
ing Jerusalem, and to suspend the redeployment oflsraeli troops from 
the West Bank town of Hebron.210 Each of these issues is a reversal of 
previous Peres-led negotiations.211 The final phase of negotiations, 
which was to discuss the status of Jerusalem, was already a great divid-
ing point for the more liberal Peres government and the PLO even 
before Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister.212 
The election divided Israel, as Peres, who sought to negotiate with 
the PLO, was rejected by the slimmest of margins, and thus Netanyahu 
cannot claim a mandate given to him by the majority oflsraeli voters.213 
Hamas and acted on a "right of pursuit," arresting militants and razing the homes of suicide 
attackers. !d. 
2°5 See Curtius, supra note 200, at D12. 
206 Ben Lynfield, Palestinians Hope for Peace Dividend from Ending Armed Struggle, Agence 
France Presse, Apr. 25, 1996, available in LEXlS, News Library, AFP File. 
207 ld. 
208 See Storer H. Rowley, Netanyahu Looks Like A Real Winner, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1996, at 1 
[hereinafter Netanyahu Looks]. Netanyahu, the Likud party leader, won election over Peres by an 
estimated 50.3 percent to 49.6 percent. !d. 
209 ld. 
210 Palestinians Clash with Israeli Soldiers in Hebron, Reuters World Service, June 3, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. Hebron remains a flashpoint of Israeli-Arab 
violence, where a Jewish settler massacred 29 Moslem worshippers in a Mosque in 1994 and was 
the last West Bank city to be evacuated by the Israeli Army. !d. Some 400 militant Jewish settlers 
live in Hebron amid more than 100,000 Arabs. ld. 
211 !d. 
212 Storer H. Rowley, Israelis, Palestinians Start Rough Final Phase of Talks, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 
1996, at 3. 
213 See Netanyahu Looks, supra note 208. 
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Palestinian Authority representatives, hoping for a continuation of the 
Peres government, were not optimistic about the ability to negotiate 
with the hardline, Netanyahu-led government.214 In fact, a June, 1996 
draft detailing the proposed initiatives of the Netanyahu government 
with respect to the peace process forced a response from Palestinian 
ministers stating that a declaration of war would exist if those initiatives 
were ever implemented.215 
IV. THE HISTORY OF CANADA's SELF-DETERMINATION MovEMENTS 
Today, the largely French-oriented population of Quebec plays a 
crucial role in the overall framework of the Canadian state.216 Cur-
rently, French speakers, or Francophones, comprise eighty-two percent 
of Quebec's 7.3 million residents.217 French is one of the two official 
languages of Canada, and Quebec holds 75 of 295 seats in Parliament, 
more than any other province except Ontario.218 The Quebecois drive 
for independence, if successful, would involve the potential loss of 6.9 
million Canadian citizens and nearly fifteen percent of Canada's terri-
tory.219 
A. History 
The French explorer Jacques Cartier claimed Canada for a largely 
disinterested France in 1534.220 In 1608 Quebec was founded, and 
seven years later the Jesuits in Canada became established.221 In 1759, 
the British seized Quebec from the French.222 The 1759 defeat has been 
emblazoned within the Quebec spirit ever since, as the words 'je me 
214 Wafa Ama, PLO Official Downcast after Meeting Israeli Envay, Reuters World Service,July 16, 
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. 
215 Nidal ai-Mughrabi, PLO Says Israeli Poliiy Draft Endangers Peace, Reuters World Service, june 
8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. 
216 Thread of Ethnocentrism Runs Through Separatist Movement, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, at 
12A [hereinafter Thread of Ethnocentrism]. 
217 See id. 
218 Colin Nickerson, Qyebec Appears on the Verge of Rejecting Canada, ORANGE CouNTY REG., 
Oct. 30, 1995, at A6. 
219 RoBERT A. YoUNG, THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA 1-3 ( 1995). This 
should not suggest that Quebec does not bring some financial instability to Canada as a whole: 
the province of seven million has, as of june, 1996, the highest per capita debt of any in Canada, 
chronic unemployment, and a bloated public sector. Charles Trueheart, Qyebec Secessionist Bring-
ing Case to U.S., WAsH. PosT, june 3, 1996, at A9. 
22°jOHN FITZMAURICE, QUEBEC AND CANADA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 1-2 (1985). 
221 !d. 
222Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. 
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souviens" (I remember) are, for example, inscribed onto every auto-
mobile license plate.223 The English government recognized the 
French language, French civil law, and the Catholic Church in their 
new colony in the Quebec Act of 1774, but left English the sole official 
language of Canada.224 By 1791, the English government divided the 
present Canadian state into Lower (French-native controlled) and 
Upper (English controlled) Canada, with England controlling one 
third of the Lower Canada seats in that respective legislature. 225 
A rebellion, designated "La Guerre des Patriotes," (The Patriots' 
War) lasted eighteen months beginning in 1837, and was characterized 
by gratuitously violent acts such as church desecrations, torched vil-
lages, and public hangings before the rebellion's end.226 Church lead-
ers, fearing the anti-clerical and democratic emphasis of the rebellion, 
which included the nationalization of church lands, opposed the re-
volt.227 Few major changes followed the rebellion, and ethnic tensions 
continued to simmer.228 
Lower and Upper Canada united in 1840,229 and Quebec and Eng-
lish-speaking Canada joined the Confederation in 1867.230 Under this 
new union, French became the official language of Canada's federal 
Parliament, the Quebec legislature and the courts.231 In 1869, French 
speakers in the provinces rebelled due to growing national anti-French 
legislative moves, including the revocation of school guarantees, and 
land seizures.232 Nationalism, accordingly, arose in Quebec, fanning 
outrage when a rebel leader was hung in 1885.233 In 1896, Wilfred 
Laurier became the first French-Canadian prime minister, thus thaw-
ing French-English relations.234 
The Revolution Tranquille (Quiet Revolution), signaling the politi-
cal resurgence of Canadian separatists, began on the night of June 22, 
223 !d. 
224 Hubert Bauch, What Does Quebec Really Want?, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 23, 1995, at F1 
[hereinafter What Does Quebec Really Want?]. 
225 !d. 
226 !d. 
227 FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 15-16. 
228 See id. 
229 What Does Quebec Really Want?, supra note 224, at Fl. 
230 Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. 
231 What Does Quebec Really Want?, supra note 224, at Fl. 
232 !d. 
233 !d. 
234 !d. 
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1960, when Liberals won the Quebec election.23 ·1j The growing Quebe-
cois sentiment that the province was being dominated by the anglo-
phone elite rallied French separatist intentions.236 The most startling 
emergence of Quebec nationalism was prompted by French General 
Charles de Gaulle's visit to the city in 1967, where he exclaimed, "Vive 
le Quebec libre!"(Long Live Free Quebec).237 
From June, 1960, beginning with the Liberal government of Jean 
Lesage, until the return of the Union Nationale in 1966, the Revolu-
tion Tranquille gained popular support.238 The power of the Church 
declined, and severe unemployment and failure to garner foreign 
investment prompted an alliance between the national bourgeoisie, 
technocratic professionals, organized labor and intellectuals to reject 
rural nationalism and support wider autonomy, modernization and 
pluralism.239 Thus, the Revolution Tranquille realized the thawing of a 
conservative, highly Catholic-influenced state. 240 
1. The Emergence of Nationalist Groups 
Nationalism in twentieth century Quebec began with the group 
Union Nationale.241 The group offered a conservative, nostalgic, and 
heavily Catholic-influenced vision. 242 The first truly organized Quebec 
separatist party, the Rassemblement pour L'Independence Nationale 
(RIN), sought the creation of a socialist state.243 
Several Canadian secessionist political parties emerged in the 1960s, 
including the Association Socialiste pour L'Independence de Quebec, 
Rassemblement National (RN), founded in 1964 and its parent party, 
the Creditistes, founded in 1962.244 One especially violent group was 
the Front de Liberation du Quebec. 245 That group's terrorist tactics 
culminated in 1970's October Crisis, as illustrated by the kidnapping of 
235 Robert Sibley, From La Survivance to the Quiet Revolution, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 24, 1995, 
at Cl. 
236 Jd. 
237 FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 40. 
238 !d. at 54. 
239 !d. at 55. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 32. 
243 Id. at 41. 
244 Id. at 41, 56-57. 
245 See id. at 56-57. 
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a British diplomat, as well as the Quebec Labor Minister, who died in 
his captor's custody.246 The Armee De Liberation Du Quebec also 
organized violent acts of protest247 
Rene Levesque248 founded the separatist movement Parti Quebe-
cois,249 another French-separatist party in 1968.250 Levesque and G. 
Gregoire, the leader of the RN, agreed to a fusion of both the RN and 
MS groups to form the Parti Quebecois.251 The Parti Quebecois, in 
1976, created the nationalistic Bill 101.252 The Bill set strict rules for 
the utilization of French in business, forced immigrants into French 
schools, imposed French fluency for licensed professionals, and ban-
ished the use of English commercial signs.253 In 1982, constitutional 
revisions occurred, notably Part I, 'The Charter of Rights and Free-
doms" and Part III, "Equalization and Regional Disparities. "254 The 
Charter safeguards distinct individual political, legal, and mobility 
rights as well as the collective rights of language minorities and abo-
riginal peoples, reinforcing a sense of national citizenship.255 Both 
revisions indicate the volleying between successive Canadian govern-
ments, with the revisions rejecting the singular French exception in 
favor of a government seeking to preserve a national character.256 
2. From the Meech Accord to the 1995 Referendum 
In 1980, separatists, led by Rene Levesque, lost a province-wide 
independence referendum by a sixty to forty percent margin.257 
The Quebec separatists thus failed in garnering secession258 from Can-
246 Kevin Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context-Legal Perspective, 53 LA. L. REv. 
1357, 1362 (1993). 
247 FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 40. 
248 !d. Levesque left the Liberal Party in 1967, founding the secessionist Mouvement Souverain-
tee-Association (MS). Id. at 41. The RIN promptly dissolved. ld. 
249Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. 
200 See Hubert Bauch, What Does Quebec Really Want? Part II, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 23, 1995, 
at F1 [hereinafter Part IIJ. 
2!\l FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 41. 
252 Part II, supra note 250, at Fl. 
253 !d. 
2S4 Douglas M. Brown, Canadian Integration and the Federal Bargain, 1 NEw EuR. L. REv. 321, 
329 (1993). 
2'\5 !d. 
256 See id. 
257 See Donald Neuchterlein, Will Province of Quebec Split Off From Canada?, RICHMOND TiMES-
DisPATCH, Oct. 27, 1995, atA17. 
258 Sneesby, supra note 246, at 1369-70. The legal ability to secede by Quebec has been studied 
by various theorists, who have evaluated the validity of separation by constitutional amendment 
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ada.259 In 1987, French-speaking nationalists became extremely agi-
tated with the failure of the passage of the April, 1987 Meech Accord,260 
which had designated Quebec as a "distinct society" within Canada.261 
Manitoba did not assent, New Brunswick withdrew its ratification, and 
the Meech Accord thus failed. 262 
Quebec secessionists did not abandon their hopes of realizing inde-
pendence.263 In 1990, a constitutional accord offering recognition of 
Quebec as a "distinct society" failed to win ratification.264 The Quebec 
separatists were narrowly defeated in a recent referendum held on 
October 30, 1995, with the vote being 50.6 percent to remain in 
Canada, and 49.4 percent for secession.265 Over ninety percent of 
eligible Quebec voters voted. 266 
B. The Elements in Consideration of Canadian Nationalism 
1. Religion 
Religion has played an extensive role in the quest for Quebecois 
self-determination.267 French Canadian Catholicism incited rural, na-
tionalistic tendencies and attempted to keep its members from getting 
involved in the existing political climate.268 Moreover, the Church dis-
couraged higher learning for its citizens, as evidenced by an enormous 
high-school drop-out rate, another indication that the Church was 
under the Constitution Act of 1982 and unilateral provincial secession (as of the 1995 referen-
dum). !d. 
259 Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. The officially translated ballot question is as follows: "Do 
you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having a formal offer to Canada for a new 
economic and political partnership, within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec 
and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995? Yes/No." !d. 
260 Brown, supra note 254, at 342-43. The Meech Lake Accord provided: (1) an interpretative 
clause recognizing Canadian duality (French and English-speaking communities) and the "dis-
tinct society" of Quebec's Francophone majority; (2) explicit recognition of the federal spending 
power along with curbs on its use in areas of provincial jurisdiction; (3) restoration of aspects of 
concurrent jurisdiction in immigration; ( 4) a guarantee of the existing convention that three of 
the nine justices of the Supreme Court of Canada would be from Quebec's civil bar; and (5) a 
veto for Quebec on constitutional amendments affecting national institutions. !d. 
261 Part II, supra note 250, at Fl. 
262 Sneesby, supra note 246, at 1364. 
263 See Part II, supra note 250, at Fl. 
264 !d. 
265 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. 
266 Hubert Bauch, Canada Survives, MoNTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al. 
267 What Does Qyebec Really Want?, supra note 224, at Fl. 
268 See id. 
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reluctant for any of its members to upset the existing political order.269 
In short, the Catholic Church, which enjoyed latitude under the Eng-
lish rule as a surrogate sovereign in the absence of a French-controlled 
government, did not want to see that power wrestled away.270 The 
Church thus often camouflaged any potential tendencies which would 
encourage self-determination, stating that such acts were not con-
doned by the Church.271 For example, the Catholic Church, controlling 
the French-language schooling system, admonished French Canadians 
that they would lose their identity if they sought material pleasures.272 
Thus, while Catholicism provided French Quebecois with a means of 
unity against the English (and Protestant) controlled-government, the 
Catholic Church initially discouraged active political participation.273 
The so-called Revolution Tranquille eventually convinced the Que-
becois to embrace the modern world and not rely solely on Church 
positions if they wished to shake off British domination.274 An increas-
ingly pluralist and secularized society contributed to a massive decline 
in Church influence and membership, as the proportion of Catholics 
actively practicing their religion fell from sixty to thirty percent be-
tween 1960 and 1970, and for those under twenty-four it fell to twelve 
percent.275 The Church, reacting to the conflict and rapidly changing 
structure within the Catholic Church itself, did not react to the declin-
ing Church influence.276 The Cardinals of Montreal and Quebec were 
heavily engaged in the Second Vatican Council of 1960-1965.277 Thus, 
the Church leaders, preoccupied, failed to successfully curtail the 
popular threats to its power. 278 
2. Economics 
The prospect of Quebec sovereignty has been theorized as being 
financially disastrous, both to Quebec as well as the remainder of 
Canada. 279 Separation would not necessarily allow a common cur-
269 See id. 
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 Sibley, supra note 235, at Cl. 
273 !d. 
274 See id. 
275 FITZMAURICE, supra note 220, at 60. 
276 See id. 
277 !d. 
278 !d. at 59. 
279 Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. Economists have predicted that the short-term future for 
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rency.28° For example, when Czechoslovakia split up, the common 
currency lasted approximately thirty-nine days before a flight of capital 
from the Slovaks to the Czechs necessitated a new currency. 281 The 
prospect of such an occurrence in Quebec may prove a harbinger to 
Quebec secessionists.282 Further, economic treaties such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement would not necessarily apply to Que-
bec, because Canada, and not a sovereign Quebec, signed the agree-
ment.283 Possible job losses would be staggering in Quebec, ranging 
from 100,000 to 300,000 positions, if several major companies were to 
relocate beyond Quebec. 284 
If secession is successful, the existing economic system in Canada 
would be completely overturned.285 A negative psychological effect will 
occur as the lifestyle, and economic prestige that an integrated Canada 
(and as a part of Canada, Quebec) enjoys will face some inevitable 
change.286 For example, Canada currently has a wide amount of eco-
nomic integration.287 
As of 1993, inter-provincial and international trade account for more 
than one-third of the total Canadian economy, with interprovincial 
trade as high as eighteen percent of the gross domestic product in 
1984.288 Any sizable shift in the provincial structure will necessarily 
affect the economic structure of interdependence which currently 
exists. 289 Further, even if laws controlling monetary transactions are 
created, which would mirror each other in both Quebec and the 
remnants of Canada, treaties must be constructed to ensure that active 
cooperation will occur.290 Thus, any economic separation would need 
Quebec would be bleak, having a deficit quintupling to $13 billion, as well as an exodus of 350,000 
non-French speakers. /d. For Canada, economists predicted that the secession of Quebec would 
plunge the Canadian dollar below its all-time low of 69 U.S. cents. !d. 
280 See id. 
281 Anne Swardson, A Free Quebec: Prosperity or Ruin?, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 30, 1995, at AI. 
282 See id. 
283 /d. 
284 /d. 
285 /d. 
286 Swardson, supra note 281, at AI. The author hypothesizes that Quebec, needing to adopt 
its own currency following any secession, would precipitate a low foreign exchange rate. /d. Such 
a low rate would ultimately devalue imports and devastate exports through high tariffs, and lead 
to an exodus of citizens. !d. 
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to involve future political associations, questioning whether secession 
would ever really occur.291 
3. Language 
Unlike the rest of Canada, where both English and French are 
recognized as official state languages, Quebec recognizes only 
French.292 Unprompted by public opinion, the Quebec government 
currently plans to resume strict enforcement of language laws, enforc-
ing the 1977 Charter of the French Language. 293 The Charter mandates 
and governs the use of French in the workplace, in business and in 
schooling, and regulates where (and how prominently) English and 
other languages may appear on public signs. 294 The laws were diluted 
in 1993, allowing English in outdoors signs, so long as the words appear 
at half the size of equivalent French words. 295 The use of such laws 
causes friction between the minorities, who cannot speak the French 
language, and die-hard Quebecois. 296 
C. Popular Discontent, "Nous et Les Autres'297 
Unlike other secessionist movements, the Quebec drive for separa-
tion is largely based upon xenophobic tendencies,298 which state that 
"the people" will only exist when "the people" become their own 
state.299 Cultural statistics create a sense of urgency for secessionist 
Quebecois.300 These statistics, which illustrate an overall downswing in 
the French culture, include the low birthrate among French-speaking 
Quebecois, the increasing bilingual abilities of their children, and the 
increasing political-economic clout of the non-Francophone areas of 
Alberta and British Columbia.301 
291 See id. 
292 Charles True heart, Quebec "Language Police" to Resume Enforced Use of French, WAsH. PosT, 
July 14, 1996, at A23. 
293 /d. 
294 /d. 
295 /d. The "language police," in 1993, responded to 1855 complaints about offending signs, of 
which 90 percent came from four individuals. /d. 
296 See True heart, supra note 292, at A23. 
297 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. Translated as "We and the Others," it has 
been used as a rallying cry of inspiration for a generation of Quebecois. /d. 
298 Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. "Soft" secessionists, however, utilize threats of secession as 
a way of forcing Canada to grant greater autonomy and special constitutional rights. See id. 
299 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. 
300Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. 
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1997] SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS 115 
These Quebecois cultural concerns have taken a discriminatory 
form toward those who live in Quebec and are not assimilated into the 
French culture.302 Following the separatists' narrow defeat, Quebec 
Premier Jacques Parizeau blamed the slim loss on "money and the 
ethnic vote," while vowing to "reap our revenge."303 Moreover, growing 
racial divisiveness exists. 304 Some Quebecois discriminate against any-
one who is not "pure laine" (pure wool), those who claim ancestry 
from the region's 18th-century French colonials.305 Following the failed 
drive for autonomy in 1995, some commentators noted an increase in 
chauvinism to those who are non-French. 306 The decision to separate 
based upon ethnicity poses an even more confusing dilemma to non-
French groups in Quebec: for example, Indian tribes such as the Cree 
and the Innu may wish to secede from Quebec if it ever does become 
autonomous from Canada.307 
D. International Law 
While international law generally allows states carte blanche in the 
administration of their own governmental affairs,308 an examination of 
the basic tenets of international law regarding the Quebecois separa-
tion must be conducted, as the Canadian constitution does not explic-
itly deal with secession.309 The objective and subjective standards of 
international law for a people to separate are, however, met by Que-
bec.310 Under the subjective standard, a group must popularly desire 
to form a political entity, which accordingly may be satisfied by a 
plebiscite.311 The objective standard allows secessionist groups with 
common characteristics such as history, geography, ethnicity, religion, 
or race to associate freely through the hope of group cohesion.312 
302 See id. 
303 Thread of Ethnocentrism. supra note 216, at 12A. 
304 Alexander Norris, Parizeau 's "Ethnic Vote" Remark Applauded iJy Hatemonger Groups, MoNT-
REAL GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1995, at AlO. 
305 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. 
306 Peter Savaryn, It's Ridiculous to Talk About "Founding People," EDMONTON]., Dec. 18, 1995, 
at A9. The author calls for broad tolerance, disclaiming superiority and the resulting inferiority 
should one province be granted a distinction from others. ld. 
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The Quebecois arguably consider themselves, based upon the recent 
referendum results which barely reaffirmed the present Canadian 
state, distinct from fellow Canadians.313 This would entitle secession 
based upon the subjective standard.314 The Quebecois do appear to 
meet the objective standard as well, as Quebecois largely reside in the 
territorial expanse of the Quebec province,315 share the French lan-
guage,316 and belong to an ethnic French group.317 Moreover, Quebec 
remains primarily Roman Catholic, and thus the Quebecois share a 
"common" religion. 318 Finally, Quebec was originally a French colony 
lost in 1796, and thus arguably has still-existing French foundations, 
given the large remaining French-cultural population today. 319 
V. A PossiBLE SoLUTION BEFORE DissoLUTION, AND 
DEALING WITH WHAT FOLLOWS SECESSION 
Political theorists have argued that one way to contend, successfully, 
with nationalist movements is to simply discourage their inception by 
creating a secure, stable atmosphere for that given state's members, if 
remotely possible.320 The two case studies which this Note addresses, 
the Palestinian and Quebec self-determination movements, pose 
unique variations. One involves a people, the Palestinians, on the brink 
of independence.321 The other movement, the Quebecois, involves a 
group temporarily forestalled by their own popular will,322 
The Quebec model involves a Francophone people with a history of 
antagonism toward their English-ancestry countrymen, and a people 
desperately seeking to retain their Francophone past.323 The history, 
however, of the Quebecois is colored with relatively little bloodshed 
and violence.324 These people seem to accommodate each other de-
spite numerous quests for autonomy by Quebec.325 As the 1995 refer-
313 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. 
314 See Iglar, supra note 14, at 225-26. 
315 Sneesby, supra note 246, at 1382. 
3I6Nickerson, supra note 218, at A6. 
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endum illustrates, however, there are signs that the accommodation is 
wearing thin.326 
The Palestinian model involves a people who do not share the 
unique claims to the past that the Quebecois do.327 During the Otto-
man Empire, Palestinians were a disparate group who did not share a 
common consciousness.328 The Israeli occupation, and subsequent feel-
ing of abandonment by Arab states, as well as the animosity with 
Jordan, created a rallying cry and hence a fiercely nationalistic 
group.329 Rather than the Quebecois, where a federal government has 
nearly failed in keeping the national minority placated, the occupying 
Israeli government never made such moves of accommodation.330 The 
recent overtures towards the end of the occupation was celebrated by 
Palestinians. 331 
The question of what is to be done now does remain. The fledgling 
Palestinian Authority, while seemingly heading into eventual integra-
tion, has not seen that goal realized as yet. This Note proposes sugges-
tions based upon the National Rights model for the Quebecois. 
Whether a battered national identity such as that shared by the Pales-
tinians, a national spirit molded by hatred and now being torn asunder 
through violent internal disputes, can ever be achieved, is uncertain. 
A. Analyzing Federalism 
Federalism is an economic-based governmental system, allowing fed-
eral unity to be maintained long after other motivating forces have 
dissipated.332 Federalism permits individuals to escape the homogeni-
zation imposed by the majority ethnic group: thus, this political system 
allows a minority people to exercise power within the majority state.333 
Such power, if based exclusively upon majority status, would have been 
otherwise denied. 334 Accordingly, if the minority group's acts are a 
consensus, a situation analogous to the common law theory of contract 
326 Thread of Ethnocentrism, supra note 216, at 12A. 
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328 /d. 
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exists, where a people, freely choosing to associate with others m a 
state, should remain bound to that agreement. 335 
B. Protections on Protections: Dealing With Threats to Federalism 
Minorities gaining a majority-like status may be tempted to lash out 
against their former parental majority state.336 Mter a time of being put 
down by the majority group, the minority group, now attaining at the 
least a modicum of institutional power, may decide to impose laws 
restating this power, and have no other effect. 337 Thus a federal gov-
ernment has the choice: to exercise its powers effectively to justifY the 
existence of a federation, and endure the continued criticism and 
subsequent discontent of a nationalist minority, or the federal govern-
ment risks becoming impotent through attempting to initiate laws 
which placate the minority. 338 Canada, with its calls to Quebec to not 
vote for separation, provides such an illustration.339 
The length of time that the state has embodied the claimant people 
and the associated territory of those people also plays a factor in 
determining the strength of the federal body, weighed against the 
nationalist drive for autonomy.340 The longer the nationalist group can 
identifY with the federal government, and become familiarized with 
that government's symbols and laws (unless those laws are discrimina-
tory), the less likely it is that the group will secede.341 Secessionist 
movements in states where a nationalist group has not been a part of 
that state for much time have stronger arguments for secession.342 
When such nationalist groups become frustrated that their goals are 
not realized, the predominant nationalist group in an entity may feel 
justified in behaving intolerantly toward other existing ethnic minori-
ties.343 For example, if Quebec ever seceded, the remaining English-
speaking Quebecois would probably face disillusionment as a 
335 Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 592. The 1867 agreement by the Quebecois to 
freely join the Canadian federation is such an example. !d. This should be compared to the case 
of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, who primarily emigrated following the Israeli 
takeover. GERNER, supra note 120, at 50. 
3'36 See Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 273-74. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. at 275. 
339 Sibley, supra note 235, at Cl. 
340 Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 603. 
341 !d. at 611-12, 618. 
342 See id. Accordingly, states like Quebec, a part of Canada in one way or another since 1867, 
have a more difficult time in 'justifying" their secession. !d. 
343 See Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 276--77. 
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"stranded minority," separated from the remainder of English-speaking 
Canada.344 
C. Possible Solutions for Quebec: The National Rights Model 
A transformation to overcome nationalism in a federalist setting 
necessarily involves a commitment to minority rights, coupled with a 
commitment to such rights through federal political institutions.345 The 
"experience" of democracy must be felt in order to attempt a genuine 
balance of pluralism and homogeneity, taking into account where the 
after-effects of the government's actions take place and are felt. 346 If 
the disenfranchised minority cannot pursue its linguistic and cultural 
goals, it is impossible for that minority to feel a "part" of the larger 
state.347 In short, the federal government must make itself less alien to 
ethnic minorities.348 
Under a so-called National Rights model, the parent state must 
accord a substate (the nationalist group) certain rights in order to 
secure conditions deemed necessary for the posterity of the substate's 
members. 349 Such failure to do so can justifY the substate's secession.350 
In the National Rights model, secession becomes the last resort. 351 Even 
if the larger political entity must advance common interests over time, 
the allegiance of that substate toward the federal government would 
hopefully be achieved.352 A legacy of a weak or incompetent federal 
government which either ignores the demands of a minority or acqui-
esces to the minority's every whim, without limitation, may, however, 
convince one of the ethnic groups within the substate that separation 
may not be unattractive. 353 
The consciousness of the Quebecois, if genuinely recognized by the 
English-speaking Canadian minority, should be able to be accommo-
dated within the framework of the National Rights ModeP-"4 The 
Meech Accord, which would have reaffirmed the Francophone identity 
344 Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 616. 
345 Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 279. 
34"Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, NEw EuR. L. REv. 129, 138 (1992). 
347Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 279. 
348 Id. at 286-87. Bilinguals and affirmative action-like hiring goals may dilute the feelings of 
powerlessness. !d. 
349 Id. at 312. 
350 !d. 
351 Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 312-13. 
352 See id. 
353 Id. at 276-77. 
354 See id. 
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and perhaps forestalled the 1995 referendum, would have guaranteed 
a special constitutional status to the French-speaking Quebecois.355 
Much of the Quebecois leadership have openly stated that this very 
recognition is an integral goal of their separatist drives. 356 
The general populace of Canada has much to lose if it dissolves. 357 
Economic disintegration would create potential feelings of unrest and 
uncertainty.35R Moreover, over 200 years of institutional framework 
within the Canadian system exists. 359 The Quebecois are familiar with 
the existing Canadian system, and institutional changes which recog-
nize and encourage the prospering of Quebecois culture, while also 
retaining the Quebecois' sense of approachability and familiarity with 
the Canadian culture, should prove a means of cohesion.360 
D. Starting Anew: Entering Statehood Without a Purpose 
Seeking cohesion in the Palestinian state will be much more difficult, 
given the passionate, often violent nature of the Palestinian secessionist 
drive from the Occupied Territories as well as the very character of the 
Palestinian movements themselves.361 Several obstacles confront the 
Palestinians which are not an issue for the Quebecois. First, there has 
never been a history of federalism in Palestine.362 From a province of 
the Ottoman Empire,363 to the occupation by Israel, no Palestinian 
federalist model has existed. 364 
The Palestinian people themselves are completely disparate, not 
sharing a long history of ancient ties. 365 While two hundred years of 
common occurrences have bound the Canadians together, the Pales-
tinians have struggled against not only Israeli occupation, but also 
other Arab states such as Jordan, and have often faced anonymity by 
Arab states.366 Now, as a state in the making, supposedly united, the 
Palestinians must confront a new enemy, radical factions such as 
35'• Brown, supra note 254, at 342-43. 
356Neuchterlein, supra note 257, at A17. 
3'•7 See Howse & Knop, supra note 333, at 312-13. 
35H Swardson, supra note 281, at Al. 
359 See Marchi! don & Maxwell, supra note 20, at 618. 
360 See id. 
361 See Perlmutter, supra note 169, at A19. 
362 BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 15-17. 
363 See id. 
364 GERNER, supra note 120, at 50. 
:l6!i BICKERTON & CLAUSNER, supra note 112, at 15-17. 
:166 !d. at 235. 
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Hamas, within their own ranks. 367 Thus, there has been little opportu-
nity for cohesion and establishing common cultural and social ties. 36H 
A National Rights model may be successfully pursued by the Pales-
tinians if they can somehow coalesce and make the dream of creating 
a new, strong state an outlet for their formerly, often aggressive, na-
tionalism.369 There are temptations which must be overcomeY° For 
example, as the "majority" group now in power, the Palestinian Arabs 
must try to win the allegiance of all of the now-minority peoples, 
especially the remaining Israeli settlers. 371 Thus, it is crucial that Pales-
tine, a former substate for Israel, and soon to be a state, allows an 
adequate amount of cultural, and political, autonomy to exist and thus 
legitimize its newfound power.372 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
National secession, whether actual or merely seriously considered, is 
a destabilizing, emotion-filled process. This Note discussed two very 
distinct nationalist movements in order to see if a broader analytical 
framework could be created, where a potential peaceful solution may 
be the answer. In short, given that secession is often bloody, this Note 
concludes that a National Rights model, which allows a state to remain 
intact while offering broad recognition of a minority's cultural right to 
exist and prosper, must be attempted before immediately pursuing 
dissolution. 
One movement, the Quebecois, has a people who, albeit reluctantly, 
share through confederation a common history. The other, the Pales-
tinians, whose long-standing opponent has now allowed self-rule pos-
sesses a new problem: contending with inner-turmoil and desire for 
retribution from within their own people. Moreover, the Palestinians 
must confront their role as majority in context with the remaining 
Israeli settlers, whose parent nation is no longer in political control of 
their present homeland. 
If self-determination is successful, a plethora of new states emerge. 
This often creates a global power vacuum, with states whose members 
received some semblance of pride based on territory and/or combined 
:167 Curti us, supra note 200, at D 12. 
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economic power suddenly confronting a need to re-evaluate their 
reason to exist. International law, and scholarly works, only add to the 
confusion: there are no universally-accepted definitions, or conceptu-
alizations of nationalism, and the rights of self-determination. 
Secession and self-determination will play a large role in the geopo-
litical context for some time to come. Robert Frost once noted, "Good 
Fences Make Good Neighbors."373 As this Note indicates by tracing the 
history of two diverse peoples seeking the lasting attainment of self-de-
termination, merely fencing oneself in, and failing to confront the 
issue of nationalism is ultimately valueless. Rather, a people may reach 
accommodation between the majority and minority members of a state 
only through accommodation, tearing down such walls of isolation 
brick by brick. 
Edward T. Canuel 
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